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Abstract
An efficient archive securing the integrity of VoIP-based
two-party conversations is presented. The solution is based
on chains of hashes and continuously chained electronic
signatures. Security is concentrated in a single, efficient
component, allowing for a detailed analysis.
1. Introduction
To archive voice communication in a business context,
wherever it is legally possible, is attractive from a gen-
eral viewpoint. The archiving of voice conversations pro-
vides inherent evidentiary value due to the possibility of
forensic evaluation and analysis of the contained biomet-
ric data. Methods for the latter are advanced [1], obtaining
to recorded voice communication a rather high probative
force, e.g., in a court of law. In comparison to other dig-
ital media, e.g., text documents, specific features of voice
communication can be viewed as contributing to security.
The medium of communication here consists in a linearly
time-based full duplex channel enabling inter- and trans-
activity [2]. In particular, interactivity enables the part-
ners to make further enquiries in case of insufficient un-
derstanding. That is, communication faults on technical as
well as language levels can be remedied, or at least mit-
igated, within the ongoing communication. Furthermore,
digital voice communication offers a rather high reliability
and quality of service, leading generally to a higher under-
standability of VoIP communication in comparison with its
analog predecessors [3, 4]. The mentioned properties miti-
gate to some extent the presentation problem to which digi-
tal documents are usually prone [5], e.g., misinterpretations
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due to misrepresentation, lack of uniqueness of presenta-
tion, and inadvertent or malicious hiding of content.
It is also worth to recall that security of transactions must
be assessed in context and can in general not be reduced
to information security. The communication medium voice
contributes to non-repudiation by offering an independent
means of speaker identification. The voice archiving sys-
tem presented below is, with respect to non-repudiation, the
analogue of an archive of digital documents which are not
signed but only time-stamped at entry. Such a kind of docu-
ment repository is most commonly used for electronic mail
rooms in the domain of E-government [6] and records man-
agement [7]. But due to the intrinsic properties of voice, the
probative value of securely archived conversations can rea-
sonably be assumed to be much higher than in this analogy.
The state-of-the art of digital voice recording as used
widely for instance in financial institutions, is marked by
solutions that directly capture VoIP streams and use secu-
rity only at the transport layer (SSL) [8, 9]. The neglect of
security of the stored conversations is perhaps an outcome
of the mentioned advantageous features of voice. Never-
theless, we argue that the probative force of digitally stored
voice requires in particular the proper consideration of the
integrity of the voice communication during and after stor-
age, like for any other digital data.
Related work on securing the integrity of streamed data
by signatures is scarce. The authors of [10] describe a
method for stream signatures for broadcast media. In [11,
12] a method to transport authentication information em-
ploying watermarks and steganography is presented. Dig-
ital signatures are not explicitly used and achievable data
rates seem low.
This motivates our present approach to devise a secure
archive for VoIP-based communication. Section 2 explains
the specific security requirements for such an archive. Sec-
tion 3 describes its design and implementation proper, from
base concept and architecture to implementation. Section 4
examines the most important possible attacks and how they
can be dealt with, thus providing a security analysis of the
archive concept. Section 5 contains conclusions and an out-
look to future work.
2. Requirements for a secure VoIP archive
The secure archiving voice based communication must
take four main areas of requirements into account, namely
security, efficiency, scalability, and long-term aspects.
In the area of security the main goal is to establish the
limited non-repudiation of the archived communication de-
scribed in the introduction. This comprises
cohesion Each archived conversation has to provide a
proof of cohesion. That is, the ordering, temporal se-
quencing, and completeness of the stored communica-
tion packets must be verifiable to enable a reconstruc-
tion of the conversation.
integrity has to be assured to maintain that a communi-
cation was not changed at any point during or after
archiving.
creation time Each conversation has to be reliably asso-
ciated with a certain time, which must be as close as
possible to the conversation’s start and the initiation of
the archiving.
While a secure assignment of a creation time is a general
requirement for most digital archives, it serves, for a VoIP
archive, also as a base to establish cohesion by providing a
temporal context. Integrity of voice communication refers
not only to raw data, but also to cohesion. Therefore, to
achieve the desired combination of cohesion and integrity,
it is insufficient to simply store raw VoIP streams in the
archive, since those are amenable to forgery by cutting.
Thus it is highly desirable, both from a security as well
as an efficiency viewpoint, to secure and archive a VoIP
conversation as “close” as possible to its transmission, and
conceptually close to the actual VoIP stream. To provide a
solution for a secure VoIP archive in this extended sense is
our main contribution.
The second area regards vital efficiency aspects of a real
world implementation. Simplicity of the implementation
should minimise the effect on existing systems and infras-
tructures, e.g., client-side requirements for the archiving
process should be completely avoided. A tight integration
is required to enable the utilisation of existing infrastruc-
tures without or with only minor changes. An efficient use
of memory and computational resources can be achieved
by basic conceptual design decisions. One major require-
ment in this context is that the data are streamed direct to
the archive without necessitating a buffering of a whole
conversation (e.g. to sign it after termination). This en-
tails that all security-related operation are performed on the
data stream on-the-fly and optimally concentrated in a sin-
gle module with minimum storage of its own. Alternatives,
like converting a recorded conversation, e.g.,to a Blob in the
same or another audio format and signing it after the call is
completed is conceptually not different from electronically
signing an arbitrary digital document. Such an approach
will a) possibly (depending on the target format) loose the
contextual information about temporal order and direction
of the communication, and b) introduce another component
(for audio conversion) potentially subject to forgery attacks.
Apart from that, it would be inefficient since most VoIP
codecs already provide good compression and thus conver-
sion to, e.g., MP3, will be costly in terms of memory and
computational power.
The last area is the scalability of the concept. Consid-
ering the amount of voice communications in a company
or call-centre, it is obvious that archiving solutions have to
cope with a broad spectrum of workloads to be handled.
The concept should therefore for instance enable the usage
of external archiving infrastructures. Scalability is another
reason to prefer a streaming security solution over an inter-
mediate storage and securing conversations afterwards. In
particular the memory requirements in the latter case pose,
e.g., a hard upper threshold for the number of concurrent
calls, respectively duration of stored conversations in the
temporary memory.
Some long-term aspects of information security have to
be considered as well with respect to the archiving and ver-
ification processes. For instance, the concept has to assure
that it is possible at later times to apply certain transforma-
tions on the data as they can be required if, e.g., certificates
are withdrawn, the security of cryptographic algorithms is
no longer assured, or it is needed to transform the voice data
into a different data format to ensure readability [13, 14].
These problems, though outside of the scope of our concept
proper, should be mitigated by a modular design and use of
openly documented technology.
3. System design and implementation
In this section, we describe a high-level architecture for
a voice archive scenario, the basic concepts underlying our
approach, and a concrete implementation of its central com-
ponent which ensures security of the archive.
3.1. Architecture design
The main design principle in the implementation and de-
ployment variant we describe here is that of minimal tech-
nical requirements at the part of the communication clients.
The presented architecture is also used as a system model
for potential attacks in the next section. Figure 1 shows
the communication between two partners A and B over a
VoIP channel, which is an idealisation, comprising in par-
ticular session initiation and communication. At a certain
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Figure 1. High-level architecture
point in the channel, the VoIP security component VSe
listens to the communication. VSe, which is the main
component implementing the base security concept of Sec-
tion 3.2, could be located at the site of either of the par-
ties A or B, e.g., in the case of call-centre applications, but
this is not necessary in principle. The component Ar de-
notes the archive to which the secured VoIP communication
is submitted and then persistently stored. T1 and T2 are ad-
ditional time-stamping authorities (TSA) which come into
play to raise resilience against attacks exerted by attackers
situated in positions (1)-(4), see Section 4 below.
Ar is the component to which also the mentioned long-
term aspects are deferred. Research has yielded some sound
solutions for the efficient, secure, long-term archiving of
signed digital documents, mostly based on the use of hash-
trees [15]. Some systems are already on the market which
can be flexibly combined with [16, 17] or are already inte-
grated into document management systems [18]. Applica-
tion of such systems in the role of the voice archivist Ar
suggests itself.
VSe will often be under the control of one of the parties
or even be integrated in their VoIP infrastructure. Neither
the exact position in the channel nor the technical method
by which VSe intercepts it is essential for the architecture
and its security properties discussed below in Section 4. The
role of VSe can be passive or dual, listening to communi-
cation and enforcing policies on it. We will present a single
example of policy enforcement by VSe in Section 3.2. The
separation of such a component from the rest of the system
is standard in security engineering where it is commonly
known as a reference monitor [19].
In accordance with the mentioned principle of minimal
client involvement the communication between A and B is
in particular not required to be digital, let alone SIP/RTP
based, end-to-end, provided that there is some part of the
channel which is VoIP. This condition is already met in
many mobile and public switched networks. In particular,
the phones used by A and B need not be ISDN or VoIP
phones.
Furthermore, the application domain of the presented
voice archive concept and architecture is not restricted to
intra- and inter-organisational telephony. In principle it
comprises archiving of any packet-based digital voice con-
versation, e.g., in (tele-) conferences, or digital radio com-
munication as used by government authorities and organi-
sations entrusted with security tasks, see [20].
3.2. Base concept
A digital multimedia communication consists in general
in two channels transporting data packets and meta data
back and forth between two partners. The proposed concept
handles these data by creating so-called intervals, contain-
ing several packets. The integrity of each interval is secured
by hashes and the application of a cryptographic secret to
protect the hash value. At the start of an archiving pro-
cess VSe cryptographically secures sufficient data to pro-
vide a unique identity the subsequent stream, to ensure the
archive’s integrity.
To ensure cohesion two measures are taken. First a cryp-
tographic chain is formed by including the hash value of
one interval in the data used to compute its successor. An
attacker cannot remove a single interval without invalidat-
ing the subsequent hashes and thus being detected. Due to
the cryptographic secret applied to each interval any manip-
ulation of a interval’s content as well as addition or deletion
of intervals is excluded.
At the end of the chain a special terminating package is
added signalling its end. If this package is missing it is clear
that the archived version was tampered with in transmission
between VSe and Ar or was incompletely archived due to
a malfunction in Ar.
During archiving of a conversation, VSe monitors the
quality of service (QoS) of the voice connection. If a cer-
tain QoS threshold in terms of, e.g., packet loss, is under-
run then either the connection quality is poor and the partic-
ipants cannot understand each other with a sufficient qual-
ity, or there is an ongoing attempt to attack the communi-
cation. Both cases lead to a lack of trustworthiness of the
archived conversation. It is now a matter of policy how to
deal with this QoS under-run. It could be ignored, the users
could be notified while continuing the archiving, the archiv-
ing could be aborted, or the call could be terminated. The
first two options open the path for certain semantic attacks
as will be discussed in Section 4. We favour termination
of the call as this the option for maximum security and the
QoS threshold is seldom reached without a breakdown of
the connection anyway due to insufficient understandability
or software timeouts. It should be noted that this is not an
essential design decision and that the policy actually em-
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ployed depends on security requirements of the application
scenario. QoS as such and in particular packet loss is, how-
ever, an essential point that a secure VoIP archive has to
cope with.
The QoS observed by VSe is not identical to the ones
perceived by either A or B, but rather only an upper bound
for them. The sharpness of the bound depends on the “dis-
tance” of VSe to A or B in the channel. In applications
it can therefore be a good choice to integrate VSe with the
VoIP system of one of the parties, perhaps the one interested
in the archiving in the first place.
The length of a interval and the QoS threshold are the
main free parameters in the concept. While the latter
depends on application-dependent (security) requirements,
see [3], the former should be optimised so as to minimise
cryptographic workload and storage overhead. This must be
balanced with the loss of conversation context in the case of
a QoS under-run, when the last interval has to be discarded.
Dynamic adaption of interval length is also the lever to sat-
isfy the scalability requirement described in Section 2.
3.3. Implementation and protocol integration
3.3.1 Overview
The archive system has been implemented as a prototype
and tested with several soft phones and hardware- devices
(e.g., AVM’s Fritz!Box [21]) using the SIP and RTP pro-
tocols. For nomenclature of these protocols used below
see [22, 23, 24]. In the place of B we used mobile phones,
ISDN phones, and also SIP software clients. VSe was im-
plemented using C#, running on an embedded x86 based
PC without keyboard, mouse or video ports. The Linux op-
erating system with the Mono-framework was used to run
the program. It was placed as a proxy between A and the In-
ternet using its two NICs, and thus supports multiple clients
and calls at the same time. VSe is implemented as an out-
bound proxy substituting A’s original outbound proxy. The
proxy modifies RTP ports and IP addresses contained in the
SIP packets redirecting them to itself and in turn forwards
them to the original recipients. A traditional PC was used
for Ar, connected using the third NIC of VSe. They com-
municate over a reliable TCP channel (for privacy also the
TLS protocol could be used).
RTP-packets are grouped in intervals where each interval
is signed and stored on Ar. Each interval consists of about
one second worth of RTP packets. Because the implementa-
tion only supports bidirectional calls (conference calls have
not yet been implemented at the time of writing), there were
two intervals per second, one for each channel/RTP stream.
The duration of an interval is one of the main configuration
parameters to be tuned. One second proved to be sufficient
to provide a high level of security for the context of the
talk on the one hand. On the other hand it keeps the com-
putational power required by far low enough for the used
x86 processor and also the storage overhead (400 bytes for
PKCS#7 signatures without embedded certificates) to pay-
load ratio small.
VSe carries a X.509 certificate together with the pri-
vate (RSA) key to sign (using asymmetric cryptography) all
intervals, including the special start and stop interval con-
taining meta data. The certificate that VSe carries is not
only used to sign the contents of the call for the final archiv-
ing and later verification, but also to authenticate VSe to
Ar. Immediately after completion intervals are transmitted
to Ar, which then performs several tests on the interval,
including verification of the signature and then stores it as
chunks into an open file. The executed tests are:
CHK1 Checking whether the first interval with the meta data
is correctly signed by the external time-stamping ser-
vice T1. In particular Ar compares the time with
that recorded by VSe in the interval preventing VSe
(without collaboration of T1) from forge a different
call time. If there is an additional third party proof of
the time of communication (like an itemised bill from
the phone company) this can as well be compared to
this initial time stamp.
CHK2 Validating the PKCS#7 signature of the interval. This
authenticates VSe to Ar and ensures that no other
person can submit streams to Ar. Ar does not know
the private key that VSe knows, but can check it
against the certificate and a trusted root.
CHK3 Verifying interval chaining. Ar stores the SHA1 hash
of the last interval and compares it to the embedded
hash value in the current one. If they do not match the
chain was broken and communication is terminated.
CHK4 Checking packet loss by checking the absolute se-
quence numbers in the interval structure. If the packet
loss is above the QoS threshold, the archiving is
aborted by Ar and the call terminated by VSe, by
injecting a BYE command terminating SIP and RTP
forwarding. We chose 1% packet loss as threshold,
which still ensures good understandability.
CHK5 Checking the time embedded by VSe in the inter-
vals whether it drifted not more than two times the
interval duration from the internal clock of Ar. In
the demonstrator, clocks were synchronised with NTP,
which should be replaced with a secure, trustworthy
time source in a production system.
CHK6 Checking the temporal integrity of the RTP packets,
i.e., whether the time-stamps and sequence numbers
stored in the RTP protocol, which can suffer from
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Nonce
From/To-SIP-Urls
Date/Time of start of call
Start-interval:
h( ) – Hash of last interval
Date/Time of this interval
Direction/channel
List of absolute packet-numbers
full RTP-packets
Interval 2:
h(  ) – Hash of last interval
Date/Time of this interval
Direction/channel
List of absolute packet-numbers
full RTP-packets
Interval n-1:
h(  ) – Hash of last interval
Date/Time of this interval
Direction/channel
Termination condition: hang-up or error
Interval n:
Figure 2. Format of the archived calls show-
ing chaining of interleaved channels
overflows and rollovers, are consistent with the time
recorded in the interval.
In this way the whole conversation is continuously and se-
curely streamed from VSe to Ar and VSe never needs to
store more than 2s worth of RTP packets per call in mem-
ory (in particular a hard disk is in principle not required on
VSe). VSe also has to do only about two RSA signing
operation per second.
3.3.2 Data format
The format used to stream the call from VSe to Ar con-
sists of intervals, including a special initial interval carrying
meta data, a final interval containing the reason of the ter-
mination of the call, and several intervals with voice data
(initial and final interval do not carry any voice data). Each
of the intervals stems from either RTP channel from A to
B or the other direction. Each interval is embedded in an
PKCS#7 signed envelope container. Only the first interval’s
PKCS#7 signed envelope container contains the whole cer-
tificate chain up to, but not including the root, while all other
containers don’t need to carry this redundant information.
The first interval is also additionally wrapped in a signature
from the time stamp service T1. Ar simply stores each
interval (together with its signature), e.g., to its hard drive
after performing the described checks on it. The signed and
timestamped content of the initial interval consist of
• A random nonce. This mitigates a replay and duplica-
tion attack, see Section 4.
• The date and time of the call.
• The from and to SIP URLs of the caller and callee.
• The mapping of RTP payloads to the used media for-
mats and codecs. This information is embedded in the
SDP bodies of, e.g., the INVITE request from the SIP
signalling. Without this information the dynamic RTP
payload in the rage from 96–127 would not be known
later when the archived call is played back. As an im-
plementation variant it is also possible that the imple-
mentation modifies the SDP negotiation to only allow
certain codecs which have a high probability to have
existing implementations available later (e.g., no pro-
prietary codecs).
The signed content of the last interval consists of
• Hash of the second-to-last interval to complete the
cryptographic chain.
• A flag that this is the last interval of an archived call.
• Reason for termination: Protocol or network error, reg-
ular hang up by A or B, violation of packet loss QoS
threshold under-run, or tamper detection.
All other intervals contain actual speech data, as follows.
• Hash of the complete, signed (and time-stamped in the
case of interval no. 2) interval before this interval.
• Date and time of this interval.
• Direction/channel of this interval. In the implementa-
tion for duplex calls between only two parties this can
be from A to B or the other direction.
• List of absolute sequence numbers of the contained
RTP packets.
• The complete RTP packets referenced by this list, in-
cluding their payload type and the truncated times-
tamps and sequence-numbers.
All intervals together form a cryptographic chain from the
first to the last interval. Intervals of both directions (chan-
nels of the duplex phone call) are interleaved. After two
intervals of one direction there must be a interval with the
other direction and the date and time in the intervals must
be sequential. Otherwise Ar or any other verifier of an
archived conversation has to reject the file, just as if a hash
value or signature was invalid.
3.3.3 Replay window
VSe contains a component to sort incoming packets and
has a replay protection which removes replayed packets.
This is implemented using a 32 Bit sliding window. Be-
cause RTP-packets only contain a 16 Bit-sequence number
(which is even recommended to not start with 0 or 1, but
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with a random value to improve symmetric encryption) and
only a 32 Bit time stamp (which also starts at a random
value, can overflow, and is not related to an absolute time)
this component also helps in creating absolute sequence-
numbers starting at 0 and checking the system time against
the time stamp of the packet for consistency. If any of these
checks is violated, the call is terminated. If VSe does not
detect these things (because it has been tampered with), then
Ar will stop archiving because it employs the same tests.
4. Security considerations
We discuss some general issues before we come to par-
ticular attacks. First, the security of the digital voice archive
cannot be better than that of an analog archive. Forgery
of voice communication is generally considered difficult,
however a cunning attacker with sufficient resources might
eventually be able to simulate any VoIP stream he desires,
and insert it to the archive, e.g., from the position (2a) in
Figure 1. Such attacks are out of the scope of the present
concept, and will remain so without involvement of the
clients and in particular their authentication and provable
trustworthiness. Nevertheless, the base principles and ar-
chitectural design of the voice archive can prevent the in-
sertion of forged communications through other channels,
respectively, from other positionings in the system model,
as will be shown below.
Finally, an inherent feature of the base concept described
in Section 3.2 is its fragility. Artificially lowering the qual-
ity of the connection, e.g., by causing or simulating (e.g.,
by B) packet loss, is clearly an attack vector and poses a
risk to the trustworthiness of a voice archive. When the
voice quality in a interval falls below a given threshold, the
cryptographic chaining ends, providing a Sollbruchstelle
(predetermined break point) for the probative value of the
archived communication, since only the parts before that
break are cryptographically verifiable. In contrast, most
other schemes for securing the integrity of streamed data,
e.g., the signing method of [10] aim at loss-tolerance, for
instance allowing for the verification of the stream signa-
ture with some probability, even in the presence of intermit-
tent packet loss. We argue that for the probative value of
inter-personal, natural language communication, the former
behaviour is advantageous. An archived call with an inter-
mediate one-second gap can always give rise to speculations
over alternatives of filling the gap, which are restricted by
syntax and grammar, but can lead to different semantics.
Using this, a clever and manipulative attacker could delete
parts of the communication before they enter the archive,
claiming with some credibility that the remnants have an-
other meaning than intended by the communication part-
ner(s). But if the contents of a conversation after such an
intentional deletion are unverifiable and thus cannot be used
to prove anything, this kind of attack is effectively impeded.
We now perform an attack analysis by the location of a
potential attacker within the system described in the previ-
ous section. The protection targets under attack are men-
tioned for each single one. The numbering of the attacks
corresponds to the positions marked in Figure 1. The analy-
sis rests on the abstract concept of Section 3.2 to exhibit its
salient security-related features. The technical variants cho-
sen in Section 3.3 are mentioned in the end of this section.
(1) Man-in-the-middle (betweenVSe and Ar). The main
threat against our method to securely archive voice data em-
anates from an attacker who can intercept and manipulate
the data in transmission from VSe to Ar. This attack vec-
tor makes the strong assumption that any transport layer se-
curity between VSe and Ar has been broken. There are
two ways to insert a forged conversation into Ar; either
he interrupts an ongoing submission to Ar by suppressing
VSe after, say, interval n and continues it himself with in-
terval n+ 1; or, he starts a submission to Ar himself, pre-
tending to be VSe. These options, threatening the cohesion
of conversations, respectively, the integrity of the archive,
are ruled out by the base concept underlyingVSe, depend-
ing on two particular countermeasures.
C1.1 Build a chain of cryptographically secured hash values
using a secret known only to VSe (or shared between
VSe and Ar). This prevents (1) from executing the
first attack variant since he cannot continue the chain
of intervals. For detectability of (1) by Ar during a
submission, the use of the correct secret should be ver-
ifiable by Ar. Various symmetric or asymmetric cryp-
tographic methods provide for the desired features.
C1.2 To start the chain of secured intervals and prevent the
second attack variant by (1), some initial data must be
secured. In the simplest case, this is not different from
C1.1 and consists only in securing the first interval of
the transmission. We will see below that refinements
are desirable to heighten resilience of the overall sys-
tem. The initialisation can be used in close conjunction
with C1.1, e.g., if the Diffie-Hellman protocol [25] is
used to establish a shared secret. On the other extreme
part of the spectrum, VSe can use certificate-based
authentication toward Ar to initiate the submission.
It should be noted that these two countermeasures are in-
herent in our original concept. All other countermeasures
below depend on them as technical or process implementa-
tion variants providing gradually improvements on security.
(2) Replay forgery. Consider an attacker listening to the
VoIP channel at some point near A or B and able to simulate
a VoIP conversation toward VSe. Assume (2) is recording
some initial part of a real archived conversation between
A and B. This attacker can then in principle compromise
the integrity of Ar by replaying this initial piece to VSe
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and continuing it with a different conversation, either forged
synthetically, or in collaboration with A and B. In conse-
quence, non-repudiation of the fact that a particular conver-
sation has taken place is easier, since now Ar contains two
data sets with very similar, or even bitwise identical initial
sections of a certain length. The threat of this attack to the
archive’s integrity is even larger in the following, related
case
(2a) Replay forgery with VoIP source control. Due to the
imperfection of VoIP communication, the attack of (2) is
generally difficult since he does not know precisely which
packets actually arrived at VSe. The tolerable packet loss
of VoIP is therefore likely to entail discrepancies between
original and replay even in the first interval of a commu-
nication, depending on interval size. Therefore position
(2a), where he directly listens to VSe’s data source is better
suited to a replay attack, in particular since the two conver-
sations will even appear to have been carried out at the same
time and along the same route since (2) replays the recorded
SIP meta-data as well. This meta-data, containing routing
information and system times is also difficult to forge in po-
sition (2).
C2.1 Exploitation of randomness of VoIP, i.e., packet loss is
the simplest countermeasure against (2). If the interval
size is large enough the mentioned discrepancies are
likely to occur, in effect discriminating original from
replay forgery. To raise this likelihood, VSe could
secure a determined number≫ 1 of intervals to initiate
the chain.
C2.2 Using a random seed to initiate the secured chain is a
much stronger countermeasure. Again, various meth-
ods can be applied to that end, either within VSe or
using an external source of trust, see C3.2 below.
Note that the question whether a data set that is detected to
be an artifact of a replay attack — something which can
always be determined only with a certain probability —
should be (marked and) kept in Ar or discarded is a matter
of policies.
(3) Compromised VSe secret. If an attacker has control
over VSe to the extent that she knows the secret used to
initiate and build a chain of intervals she is in the position,
like (1) but more effectively, to insert forged conversations
into Ar. If we assume that (3), possessing, e.g., VSe’s
authentication data, completely appears as VSe to Ar, still
two categories of countermeasures apply.
C3.1 Internally, VSe can use rotation of the secrets, e.g.,
one-time keys generated for every conversation from
a master secret, which in turn requires a significantly
better protection. The hardware security provided by
trusted platforms suggests itself for this purpose.
C3.2 An external source of trust can be invoked at every
submission to initiate the chain of intervals. For in-
stance, a time-stamping service T1 can be used to sign
the data initiating the chain. This relies of course on
the assumption that the authentication of VSe with
respect to T1 remains unbroken and thus (3) cannot
obtain time stamps on her own.
C3.2 additionally raises resilience against replay attacks.
Regarding (3), her only remaining attack if the latter coun-
termeasure is in effect is a replay attack as well, which will
easily be detected due to identical time stamps over, and
random seeds in, the initial data.
(4) Forgery by the archivist is prevented by a design prin-
ciple of the presented system.
C4.1 The separation of duties between VSe and Ar makes
it difficult forAr to forge secured conversations and to
claim that they originate fromVSe. This holds always
in the asymmetric situation that Ar does not know the
secret VSe uses to secure chains of intervals, but is
able to verify them, which remains a prerequisite of the
secure archiving. Even if (4) has the additional power
of (3) the further separation of duties by C3.2 and the
invocation of the time stamping service T1 effectively
suppresses his ability to forge conversations that “look
like” those coming from VSe.
C4.2 One basic security problem of long-term archiving re-
mains, namely the authority of Ar over the archived
data. This enables Ar at least in principle, given
enough time and computational power, to manipulate
the archived data. A method that is considered to be
generally effective for mitigating this threat is the use
of periodic time-stamps from another time-stamping
authority T2 over the bulk of data archived during a
period. Hash-trees are the method of choice to imple-
ment this process effectively.
Special attacks can be attempted in a combination of the
positionings above. For instance, an attacker combining
roles (1) and (2a) could try to insert a back-dated call into
Ar. From (2a), he would insert calls at times of his choos-
ing into VSe, intercept and store the generated initial in-
tervals containing time-stamps from T1 at (1) and suppress
transmission of the conversation to Ar. Later he would try
to insert the call he wishes to back-date from (2a) into VSe,
but replacing, from (1), only the initial interval by a stored
one time-stamped at the desired earlier time. This fails due
to the chaining of intervals and the uniqueness of initial in-
tervals induced by the use of a nonce, i.e., this attack is
suppressed by C2.2, in conjunction with C1.1 and C1.2.
In the technical variant described in Section 3.3, C1.2
is implemented by using digital signatures based on asym-
metric cryptography on all intervals and enveloping the first
7
interval in a cryptographic time-stamp. Countermeasures
C2.2, and C3.2 are taken into account by including a ran-
dom nonce in the first interval, and use of the initial time-
stamp from the external TSA T1, respectively.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a system for archiving VoIP-based
communication which has some salient security features in
contrast to existing digital voice recording solutions. The
present solution is stand-alone and offers a high degree of
scalability, ease of integration, and efficiency without trade-
offs with respect to security.
Certain advanced implementation variants can be envis-
aged based on our concept. In particular, utilisation of
trusted platforms (TP) as specified by the trusted computing
group [26] suggest themselves. A TP can be used for vari-
ous security-related tasks in VSe, e.g., storing secrets, se-
curing data channels and interfaces, or providing a trustwor-
thy computing environment. As another instance of trusted
computing usage, the time-stamping by VSe could be im-
plemented using an internal trusted clock of VSe seeded
daily by T1, in order to reduce the cost of purchasing time-
stamps.
A real-world implementation also needs to consider con-
ditions for, and signalling and negotiation of recording of a
conversation. The draft standard [27] describes a method
by which “One party may assert either their desire to record
or their restriction of the other party’s recording”. Using
these assertions in our archiving architecture in the sense
that VSe evaluates and respects them would be a nice way
to disarm privacy reservations to indiscriminate recording
of calls. On the other hand, signalling of archiving status
and (reasons for) termination of the archiving, respectively,
the call are desirable future features. A device independent
way using speech synthesis can be envisaged.
As an outlook, it seems possible to extend the present
concept to a full-fledged electronic signature over VoIP-
based conversations. This includes, either unilateral or
mutual, authentication of communication partners, non-
repudiation of a conversation’s content, and ultimately leads
to a probative force of such conversations equivalent to
other electronically signed documents. This enables dec-
larations of will and establishment of binding contracts by
voice. Of course such an advanced scenario is no longer
possible without a certain involvement of the clients, in par-
ticular their trustworthiness and integration into an authenti-
cation infrastructure like a PKI. Working out this advanced
scenario is in progress [28].
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